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Abstract
In this paper, we study a local public good game in an endoge-
nous network with heterogeneous agents. We consider two speci-
fications in which different networks arise. When agents differ in
the cost of acquiring the public good, active agents form hierarchi-
cal complete multipartite graphs; yet, better types need not have
more neighbors. When agents’ benefits from the public good are
heterogeneous, nested split graphs emerge in which investment need
not be monotonic in type. In large societies, few agents produce
a lot and networks dampen inequality for most agents under cost
heterogeneity and increase it under heterogeneity in benefits.
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Consider consumers who decide how much information about alterna-
tive products to acquire or farmers who learn about new fertilizers. To
choose between alternatives whose advantages they do not know, they ac-
quire some information either personally or through their peers.
Since agents benefit from their neighbors’ investment, the personal ac-
quisition of information is a local public good. In these situations, as well
as in many others, the network of interactions is, at least to a certain ex-
tent, endogenous. Since social structure often depends on the factors it
affects, this poses a challenge to the estimation of the impact of social net-
works (Jackson, 2008, p. 437). Indeed, individual characteristics affect an
agent’s decision on public good provision and networking: influential con-
sumers enjoy shopping more (Feick and Price, 1987) and farmers imitate
more experienced neighbors (Conley and Udry, 2010). Yet, while games
on fixed networks have been thoroughly studied (Bramoulle´, Kranton and
D’Amours, 2014), there is far less understanding of strategic interactions
when networks are endogenous.
A relevant exception is Galeotti and Goyal (2010), henceforth G&G,
in which homogeneous agents simultaneously choose public good provision
and links, which are established unilaterally. They find that strict Nash
equilibria are core-periphery networks in which few agents produce a sig-
nificant amount of the public good, the so-called law of the few. However,
some complementarity in neighbors’ actions or decay in information flow
invalidates these results. Yet, for a theory to be empirically relevant, it
should have robust predictions. Furthermore, it is important to under-
stand the role of heterogeneity in individual characteristics.
The aim of this paper is precisely to find robust predictions on who
produces what amount and who links with whom when different sources of
heterogeneity are introduced into the framework of G&G.
In particular, we study a framework in which agents differ in the (linear)
cost or in the (concave) benefits of the public good. For example, some
consumers enjoy shopping more and some farmers better assess the reaction
of their crops to the fertilizer because they are more experienced. As a
result, they differ in the marginal cost of collecting information. On the
other hand, richer consumers and farmers with more land value the same
piece of information more because they can exploit it better. Hence, they
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differ in the marginal utility of the public good. In both cases, better types
are those who optimally invest more into the public good in isolation.
When the network is exogenous, the actual source of heterogeneity does
not matter. However, it influences the decision of whether to establish a link
by determining how much different types gain from a connection (Lemma
1). As a result, the network architectures that arise in equilibrium differ
in (i) the relationship between investment, number of neighbors, and type,
and (ii) whether a core of well-connected agents emerges. This is the “rich
club phenomenon”, first described in Zhou and Mondragon (2004), which
we are the first to explain as a result of strategic interaction.
3 
4
5
6 
7
Inactive 
player
PeripheryCore
First 
layer
Second 
layer
2
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
1
2
1
6
4
5
Core
Periphery
Isolated 
Agents
3 
7 
8 
2
1
6
4
5
3 
7 
8 
(a) Heterogeneity in Production Cost
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(b) Heterogeneity in Valuation
Agents are labeled from the best to the worst type starting from 1.
Figure 1: Nash Equilibria of Public Good Games in Endogenous Networks.
In the model with cost heterogeneity, players with a lower production
cost find it more profitable to produce rather than to free ride, but worse
types free ride on them. As a result, agents are more likely to be connected
to players who are very different from them; in particular, the best types are
not interconnected. Rather, social hierarchies with a pyramidal structure
emerge (Figure 1(a)): active connected agents are ordered in independent
sets, i.e. layers of similar types that are not connected, and form complete
multipartite graphs (Theorem 1). Better types produce more and belong
to smaller, higher layers. In such equilibria, centrality and type might not
be monotonically related (Corollary 1) because of the links established by
inactive agents (such as agent 7).
In the model with heterogeneity in benefits, better types gain more
from a link: if one agent links, all those with higher valuations link as well.
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Hence, the best players form a core of very active agents. Worse types are
less willing to link and need less of the public good, and eventually are
isolated. Equilibrium networks are then nested split graphs (Figure 1(b))
in which one’s neighborhood is a subset of the neighborhoods of the better
type agents (Theorem 2). Since active agents at the periphery with different
links just produce enough to access their stand-alone optimal output, better
types need not produce more (Corollary 2).
Efficient architectures are stars where the worst or the best types (but
1) are isolated depending on the source of heterogeneity (Proposition 1).
We extend the law of the few to a society with arbitrary degrees of
heterogeneity in cost or in valuation of the public good in the local public
good game proposed in the seminal paper of G&G (Proposition 2).1 The
networks we get are also negative assortative (Newman, 2002): few agents
tend to have a large number of connections with poorly connected ones.
These properties are relevant because they arise in many contexts.2
Networks dampen inequality for most agents under cost heterogeneity
and increase it under heterogeneity in benefits (Proposition 3). Again, this
stresses the importance of how the gains from links change with type.
The model we have described so far is very stylized. Yet our results
are robust to many extensions relevant for empirical applications. In par-
ticular, we can introduce both types of heterogeneity at the same time,
the indirect flow of spillovers, some decay, imperfect substitutability be-
tween one’s effort and that of others, and heterogeneity in the linking cost
(Proposition 4).
Often, those who initiate communication bear the associated cost, such
as paying for a phone call or going to someone’s farm. Therefore, in our
model, links are established unilaterally. While this assumption is not
always appropriate, the same networks arise when mutual consent is needed
to create a link and agents can make transfers (Proposition 5).
We further discuss the relationship between G&G and our work at the
end of Section 3. When agents’ efforts are strategic complements instead,
1G&G consider a very limited form of heterogeneity, i.e. one agent has a lower
production cost than the others, in which case this player is the hub of a star.
2Some examples are the networks observed in peer-to-peer exchanges (Adar and Hu-
berman, 2000), intra-sector R&D (Tomasello et al., 2013), inter-bank linkages (Sorama¨ki
et al., 2007), and trade (De Benedictis and Tajoli, 2011).
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either nested split graphs or complete multipartite graphs emerge when
best replies are increasing and convex or concave, respectively (Hiller, 2012
and Baetz, 2015). We obtain these structures with strategic substitutes,
i.e. decreasing best replies, depending on how the gains from a connection
differ with types. Hence, we provide a unifying approach that is a first step
towards a general theory of strategic interaction in endogenous networks.
Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) study public good provision in fixed
networks. They show that there always exist specialized equilibria in which
active agents are organized in an independent set and their direct neighbors
are inactive. However, links are often at least to some extent endogenous.
In these situations, studying the incentives to link matter. As first noted by
G&G, fewer effort profiles are equilibria when the network is endogenous,
because production and links are deeply related: players establish a link
only if it gives them access to enough public good.
In particular, we model network formation non-cooperatively as in Bala
and Goyal (2000) who show that center-sponsored stars are strict Nash
equilibria of a model without effort choice, two-way flow of information,
and homogeneous agents. Heterogeneity in benefits plays a minor role
here: equilibrium networks are a collection of stars (Galeotti, Goyal and
Kamphorst, 2006). It plays a major role instead when the gains from
connections depend on agents’ investment. When linking costs are also
heterogeneous, Billand, Bravard and Sarangi (2011, 2012) give sufficient
conditions for the existence of Nash networks, which do not necessarily
exist (Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi, 2007), an issue that does not emerge
here.3
1 Model
We now introduce a local public good game, in which agents exert effort
and establish costly connections to free ride on the effort exerted by others.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
Players. There is a set of players N = {1, ..., n}; i denotes a typical player.
3Haller and Sarangi (2005) were the first to study heterogeneity in the model of Bala
and Goyal (2000) with perfect indirect flow of information. In particular, they focus on
heterogeneity in link failures. In our paper, links never fail.
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Network. Player i’s set of links is represented by a row vector gi =
(gi1, ..., gii−1, gii+1, ..., gin), where gij ∈ {0, 1}, for each j ∈ N \{i}. Let gi ∈
Gi = {0, 1}n−1. We say that player i links to player j if gij = 1. The cost
associated to a link is supported by those who initiate the communication,
similarly to a phone call. Hence, linking decisions are one-sided: the agent
proposing a link pays k and the link is established. Since in our game,
direct spillovers are never negative, incoming links are always accepted.
The network g obtained from the players’ linking strategies is a directed
graph. We define NOUTi (g) = {j ∈ N : gij = 1} as the set of players to
which i links, and ηOUTi (g) =
∣∣NOUTi (g)∣∣ as the number of links that i
sponsors.
The closure of g is an undirected network denoted by g¯, where g¯ij =
max{gij, gji}, for each i, j ∈ N . That is, each directed link in g is replaced
by an undirected one. Let Ni(g¯) = {j ∈ N : g¯ij = 1} be the set of players
to which i is linked in the undirected graph g¯, and let ηi(g¯) = |Ni(g¯)| be
the number of i’s neighbors in g¯, or i’s degree.
There is a path in g¯ between i and j if either g¯ij = 1, or there are m
different players j1, ..., jm distinct from i and j, such that g¯ij1 = g¯j1j2 =
... = g¯jmj = 1. The length of the path is 1 in the first case, and m + 1 in
the second. A component of the network is a set of agents such that there
is a path connecting every two agents in the set and no path to agents
outside the set. A network g¯ is connected if there is a unique component
encompassing all agents, and minimally connected if it is connected and
there exists only one path between every pair of players. We denote the
set of isolated agents as I(g¯) = {i | g¯ij = 0 for all j ∈ N}.
In a core-periphery graph, there are two groups of players, P(g¯), the
periphery, and C(g¯), the core, such that for every i, j ∈ P(g¯), g¯ij = 0, while
for every l,m ∈ C(g¯), g¯lm = 1; furthermore, for any i ∈ P(g¯), there exists
l ∈ C(g¯) such that g¯il = 1. A complete core-periphery network is such that
Ni(g¯) = C(g¯) for all i ∈ P(g¯), and Nl(g¯) = N \{l} for all l ∈ C(g¯). Nodes in
C(g¯) are referred to as hubs. A core-periphery network with a single hub is
referred to as a star. A core-periphery network in which the sets of agents’
neighbors are nested is a nested split graph: for any pair of agents i and j,
if ηi(g¯) > ηj(g¯), then Nj(g¯) ∪ {j} ⊂ Ni(g¯) ∪ {i}.
An independent set of g¯ is a non-empty subset of players who are not
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linked. In a complete multipartite graph, agents can be partitioned into a
number S of independent sets Hs(g¯∗), s = 1, ..., S, such that every agent
shares a link with all agents outside her own set.
A network is negative assortative if the average degree of one’s neighbors
is decreasing in one’s own degree (Newman, 2002).
Effort. Player i’s effort is denoted by xi ∈ X, where X = [0,+∞). A
player i is active if xi > 0; otherwise i is inactive.
Strategies. Player i’s set of strategies is Si = X × Gi, and the set of all
players’ strategies is S = S1 × ... × Sn. A strategy profile s = (x, g) ∈ S
specifies investment x = (x1, ...xn) and links g = (g1, ...gn) for each player.
Payoffs. We consider a game of positive local externalities: direct neigh-
bors’ investments in the public good are perfect strategic substitutes. Hence,
player i’s payoffs under strategy profile (x, g) are:
Ui(x, g) = fi
(
xi +
∑
j∈Ni(g¯)
xj
)
− cixi − ηOUTi (g)k, (1)
where k > 0 is the linking cost paid by the player who initiates a link and
fi(x) is twice continuously differentiable in x and i. Furthermore, (i) fi(x)
is a strictly concave and increasing function in x for all i ∈ N , and (ii) for
all i, f ′i(0) > ci, and limx→∞f
′
i(x) = mi < ci.
Under these assumptions, there is a unique and non-negative optimal
investment in the public good in isolation for every i denoted by
ai = arg max
xi∈X
fi(xi)− cixi.
We introduce ex ante heterogeneity in two ways.
(a) Differences in the cost of producing the public good: fi = f for
all i, while c1 < c2 < ... < cn, i.e. agents are heterogeneous in how efficient
they are in producing the local public good. For example, some consumers
enjoy shopping more and some farmers better assess the reaction of their
crops to fertilizer because they are more experienced.
(b) Differences in the valuation of the public good: ci = c for all i
and ∂2fi/∂x∂i < 0, or f
′
i(x) > f
′
j(x) for all x > 0, if i < j. For example,
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there could be richer consumers, farmers with more land and firms with
bigger market shares. These agents would value information more, accessed
directly or indirectly, because they can exploit it better.
Under both specifications, the players’ types capture the amount of
public good they would optimally collect in isolation such that a1 > a2 >
... > an. We refer to lower-indexed agents as better types. We assume that
all inequalities are strict, i.e. there is one player per type. This assumption
simplifies the analysis but does not substantially affect our results.
We define player i’s gain from a connection to player z who produces
xz ≥ 0 given a certain amount y of spillovers already received as
GCi(xz, y) = fi(x
′ + xz + y)− fi(xi + y)− ci(x′ − xi),
where x′ = arg maxx≥0 fi(x + xz + y) − cix is the effort that i exerts after
accessing z’s production of the public good. The following lemma describes
how the gains from a connection change with type in both models.
Lemma 1 Under heterogeneity in the cost of producing the public good,
GCi is increasing in i. Under heterogeneity in the valuation of the public
good, GCi is decreasing in i.
In particular, under cost heterogeneity, players value the spillovers associ-
ated with an additional link identically, but more efficient players enjoy a
lower reduction in production cost. Hence, they have lower gains from a
connection. Conversely, under heterogeneity in the valuation of the public
good, better types benefit more from spillovers, while producing the public
good has the same cost for all players.
Equilibrium. A strategy profile s∗ = (x∗, g∗) is a Nash equilibrium if for
all si ∈ Si and all i ∈ N , Ui(s∗) ≥ Ui(si, s∗−i), where s = (si, s−i). For
heterogeneous agents, small perturbations of the valuation or production
costs are enough to break eventual ties, so that we focus on strict equilibria,
in which the inequalities in the above definition are strict for all players.
Social Welfare. For any s ∈ S, social welfare is given by the sum of
individual payoffs, SW (s) =
∑
i∈N Ui(s). A strategy profile s
∗ is socially
efficient if SW (s∗) ≥ SW (s), for every s ∈ S.
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2 Main Analysis
In this section, we characterize the equilibria of this game, solve the social-
planner problem, derive results for large societies, and study inequality.
The results are stated in terms of the closure of equilibrium networks
g¯∗, partly because, under heterogeneity in the valuation of the public good,
there are equilibria in which both parties involved in a link could sponsor
it, so that the corresponding closure of the directed graph is identical.
2.1 Equilibrium Analysis
The next lemma shows that, in equilibrium, active agents always collect
exactly the level of public good they would in isolation. This is very helpful
to characterize the equilibria of both models.
Lemma 2 Given any Nash equilibrium, s∗ = (x∗, g∗), x∗i +
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j ≥
ai, for all i ∈ N , and if x∗i > 0, then x∗i +
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j = ai.
The proof is omitted since it is a straightforward extension of a result
in Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) to the case of heterogeneous players.
Lemma 2 implies that the set of active players cannot be fully intercon-
nected when agents differ in the amount of public good they optimally
collect in isolation. Otherwise, they would have access to the same amount
of public good, so that someone would have a profitable deviation. Hence,
stars are the only complete core-periphery networks that can be equilibria.
Lemma 3 In equilibrium, active players are not all connected.
2.1.1 Heterogeneity in Production Cost
When better types are more efficient in producing the public good, they
have lower gains from a connection. The payoff function is then given by:
Ui(x, g) = f
(
xi +
∑
j∈Ni(g¯)
xj
)
− cixi − ηOUTi (g)k. (2)
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The following theorem characterizes the relationship between public good
provision and type in this model.4
Theorem 1 Under heterogeneity in the cost of producing the public good,
if k ≤ f(a1)−f(an)+cnan, in a strict Nash equilibrium, active agents form
a complete multipartite graph in which better types produce more and are
in independent sets that comprise fewer agents.
Intuitively, when agents decide whether to establish a link, they compare
the gain from free riding on someone’s public good production with the
cost of acquiring the same amount of public good. For the best and most
efficient types, linking is relatively less attractive, so they might not be
connected to each other. Yet, they produce a lot. As a consequence, they
receive links from lower types that have higher gains from these connections
given their higher production cost.
In equilibrium, there is a tight correspondence between type and in-
vestment since any player always produces more than a worse type. This
is surprising in a framework where the value of connections is endogenous
because, in principle, less efficient agents could produce more to attract
many in-links. However, this is no equilibrium. Indeed, when x∗i < x
∗
j for
some i < j, both players need to have active in-links, j more so than i,
and moreover, i needs more active out-links than j. The players linking to
i and j in turn need to have active in-links themselves, some of them be-
ing distinct. Reiterating this argument recursively leads to a contradiction
since the number of players is finite.
Since the profitability of a link depends on one’s production cost, similar
players have similar out-links and produce similar quantities. Hence, agents
in the same independent set collect similar amounts of public good both
directly and via their neighbors. However, better types need to have access
to more public good, produce more, and receive many in-links from worse
types. As a result, in equilibrium, active players are ordered in a hierarchy
with a pyramidal structure in which the lower layers comprise more agents.
4When linking is sufficiently costly, the unique equilibrium is an empty network.
When the linking cost decreases, player n, who has the highest benefit from linking to 1,
eventually finds it profitable to link to 1. This yields a threshold in terms of the linking
cost below which a non-empty network exists: a periphery-sponsored star with player 1
as the hub producing a1. This guarantees equilibrium existence.
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example (a) example (b) example (c)
i ci ai x
∗
i U
∗
i U
∗
i (∅) ci ai x∗i U∗i U∗i (∅) ci ai x∗i U∗i U∗i (∅)
1 .6 2.777 .540 3.010 1.666 .695 2.070 .447 2.546 1.439 .6 2.777 .842 1.995 1.666
2 .601 2.769 .530 3.010 1.664 .774 1.670 .405 1.940 1.292 .8 1.562 .720 1.324 1.25
3 .83 1.452 .382 1.433 1.205 .775 1.665 .401 1.940 1.290 .83 1.452 .610 1.304 1.205
4 .831 1.448 .378 1.432 1.203 .831 1.448 .164 1.280 1.203 .831 1.448 .606 1.303 1.203
5 .832 1.417 .375 1.432 1.202 .832 1.445 .161 1.280 1.202 .840 1.448 0 1.3 1.190
6 .833 1.414 .371 1.432 1.200 .833 1.441 .157 1.280 1.200 .841 1.448 0 1.3 1.189
7 .834 1.411 .368 1.431 1.200 .834 1.438 .154 1.280 1.200 .842 1.448 0 1.3 1.188
8 .835 1.434 .364 1.430 1.198 .835 1.434 .150 1.280 1.198 .9 1.235 0 1.3 1.111
k k∈[.33,.44] .33 .6
Figure 2: Examples of Nash equilibria under heterogeneity in the cost of
producing the public good with f(x, g) = 2
√
xi +
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj.
Figure 2 exhibits three examples of possible equilibrium configurations
that illustrate some general features. First, equilibrium networks do not
have a core since the most efficient players need not link to each other, as
in example 2(a). This property emerges in several real-world situations.
For example, Feick and Price (1987) show that influential consumers (mar-
ket mavens) enjoy shopping more than others, and do not rely on other
market mavens’ information. Similarly, Conley and Udry (2010) show that
the most experienced farmers do not learn from each other, but rather in-
experienced farmers learn from more experienced ones. Through the lens
of our model, market mavens and experienced farmers do not free ride on
others’ information precisely because their cost of acquiring information is
so low. Therefore, they acquire much information themselves, receive many
in-links from bad types, and have a low gain from sponsoring a link.
Second, equilibrium networks display vertical clustering : someone’s
neighbors are likely to be neighbors as well when they are sufficiently dif-
ferent. This follows from the fact that similar types have similar gains from
a link, and hence, are likely to be in the same independent set, as in exam-
ples 2(a) and 2(b). This is particularly surprising because, intuitively, one
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would think that players are more likely to cluster the more similar they
are, a phenomenon which is known as homophily.
Third, equilibrium networks are negative assortative. Since equilibrium
hierarchies are pyramidal, better players have many more links than worse
types who link to them. Furthermore, similar types are not linked. There-
fore, the average degree of one’s neighbors decreases with one’s own degree.
Fourth, if some active players are connected in equilibrium, then there is
a unique component encompassing all agents. Very efficient players, except
1, can be isolated only if all other agents are inactive and link to 1. If a
very efficient player j does not link to 1 and some periphery players are
active, then all of them link to j as well. Otherwise, each of the periphery
players linking to 1 would receive more public good than j.
So far, we have restricted our attention to active agents. Yet, the behav-
ior of inactive agents reveals another important implication of the higher
gains from a connection for worse types. It is stated in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 Under heterogeneity in the cost of producing the public good,
ηi(g¯
∗) need not be monotonic in i.
Expressed in words, the number of neighbors or degree might not be mono-
tonic in type, as in example 2(c): although agents 5 to 8 are the most
inefficient players, they have two links, i.e. one more than players 3 and
4. Indeed, worse types might have more links if they are inactive because
they out-link more and need not link to all players in an independent set.
2.1.2 Heterogeneity in the Valuation of the Public Good
When better types value the public good more, the gains from a connection
are higher for better types. In this case, the payoff function is given by
Ui(x, g) = fi
(
xi +
∑
j∈Ni(g¯)
xj
)
− cxi − ηOUTi (g)k. (3)
We now show how this property affects the relationship between type and
investment. First, we characterize the equilibrium network structure.5
5When linking is sufficiently costly, the unique equilibrium is an empty network.
When the linking cost decreases, player 2, who has the highest benefit from linking to 1,
eventually finds it profitable to link to 1. This yields a threshold in terms of the linking
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Theorem 2 Under heterogeneity in the valuation of the public good, if
k ≤ f2(a1) − f2(a2) + ca2, g¯∗ is a nested split graph in which better types
have more links. Moreover, there exist n˜1 and n˜2, n˜1 < n˜2 ≤ n, such that
(i) C(g¯∗) = {i ∈ N : i ≤ n˜1, x∗i > 0} is the core of active players;
(ii) P(g¯∗) = {i ∈ N : n˜1 < i ≤ n˜2} is the periphery;
(iii) I(g¯∗) = {i ∈ N : i > n˜2} is a set of isolated players.
In equilibrium, the best players form a core because they not only need
more public good, but also gain more from a connection. Then, there are
players who do not produce enough to receive in-links, but who benefit
from linking to some players in the core. These agents form a periphery
of free riders that can be active, in which case both core players and free
riders enjoy positive spillovers. Finally, there are isolated agents whose
benefits from linking even to the top producers are too low to justify the
linking cost.
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example (a) example (b)
i bi ai U
∗
i (∅) x∗i U∗i x∗i U∗i
1 1.849 9.5 2.85 4.26 4.442 2.3 5.01
2 1.754 8.55 2.565 2.74 3.508 2.26 3.802
3 1.686 7.9 2.37 .9 2.87 2.16 2.783
4 1.627 7.35 2.205 .35 2.705 .6 2.28
5 1.621 7.3 2.19 .3 2.69 .55 2.265
6 1.370 5.21 1.563 .95 2.041 .65 1.631
7 1.082 3.25 0.975 0 1.433 .95 1.015
8 .657 1.2 .36 0 .557 1.2 .36
k - .8 .65
Figure 3: Nash equilibria under heterogeneity in the valuation of the public
good with fi(x, g) = bi
√
xi +
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj and c = .3.
Figure 3 depicts two possible equilibrium configurations that illustrate
some general properties. First, equilibrium networks are nested split graphs
with a core that contains the best types. This structure emerges because
(i) players who sponsor η links always link to the η players that invest
more and from whom they receive no in-links, and (ii) better types have
more incentives to link and produce more. In example 3(b), agents 1 to 3
constitute the core of connected agents who receive in-links, while agents
4 to 7 are at the periphery, i.e. they free ride by sponsoring links to core
players, and the more so the better their type.
cost below which a non-empty network exists: a periphery-sponsored star with player 1
as the hub producing a1. This guarantees equilibrium existence.
12
Overall, N7(g¯
∗) ∪ {7} ⊂ N6(g¯∗) ∪ {6} ⊂ ... ⊂ N1(g¯∗) ∪ {1}, i.e. the
neighborhoods of worse types are subsets of the neighborhoods of better
types. Hence, degree centrality is always higher for better types.
These two facts imply that equilibrium networks display negative as-
sortativity. In example 3(b), the average degree of player 1’s neighbors is
3, while player 7 is only linked to player 1, whose degree is 6.
By Lemma 2, active players produce enough to attain the optimal stand-
alone effort given the spillovers from their neighbors. Hence, if a player has
one link more than a worse type, the effort she exerts in order to achieve
her optimal level might be lower. In Figure 3(a), players 3 to 5 produce
less than 6 who does not link to 2. Hence, investment in the public good
need not be monotonic in type, as summarized in the next corollary.
Corollary 2 Under heterogeneity in the valuation of the public good, x∗i
need not be monotonic in i.
Finally, there can be isolated agents, such as player 8 in Figure 3(b). In
general, the worse an agent’s type, the more likely she is to be isolated
since she does not value the public good enough to pay linking cost k.
Our characterization of equilibrium networks shows that an agent’s type
and investment in general cannot be inferred from her position in the net-
work. Hence, one must be careful in interpreting degree centrality as evi-
dence of how good or important a player is.
The only architecture which can be a strict equilibrium in both models
(and in a model with homogeneous agents) is a periphery-sponsored star
with 1 as the hub. We show next that such structures are also efficient.
2.2 Efficiency
In the following proposition, the efficient allocations of production and links
in the model where agents have different production costs and valuations
of the public good are denoted by C and V , respectively.
Proposition 1 The socially optimal network is a star such that:
(a) under heterogeneity in production cost, there is n > 1 such that gi1 = 1
for all players i ≥ n, and the hub 1 produces yC given by (n−n+2)f ′(yC) =
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c1, while players 1 < i < n are isolated;
(b) under heterogeneity in valuation, there is n¯ ≤ n such that all players
i ≤ n¯ form a star with a hub that produces yV given by ∑i≤n¯ f ′i(yV ) = c,
while players i > n¯ are isolated.
The social planer minimizes linking costs. Therefore, efficient networks are
stars from which some players are excluded depending on the gains from
the connection to the hub. Due to the different relationship between type
and gains from a connection, the identity of isolated agents is very different
in the two models: under cost heterogeneity, the most efficient agents but 1
are isolated, while under heterogeneity in valuation, the agents that value
the public good the least are isolated.
Hence, decentralized non-empty equilibria always entail under-investment
since no player internalizes the marginal value of her production for all other
players. Moreover, if the equilibrium network is non-empty and is not a
star, then it is over-connected.
2.3 Large Societies
The law of the few, formally derived first by G&G, predicts that as the
number of players increases, the number of active players in the network
increases at a lower rate. This result captures well many social and eco-
nomic networks observed in reality. We now show that a similar result also
holds when agents are heterogeneous.
Given an equilibrium (x∗, g∗), we define A(x∗, g∗, ε) as the number of
agents in the component of g∗ who produce at least ε and AIN(x∗, g∗) as
the number of (active) agents in g∗ who receive at least one in-link.
Proposition 2 Under heterogeneity in valuation or in production cost,
given f1 and c1, for any ε > 0, limn→∞A(x∗, g∗, ε)/n = 0. Furthermore,
limn→∞AIN(x∗, g∗)/n = 0.
The number of active agents need not be bounded for two reasons. First,
some agents might be isolated producing their optimal amount of public
good. Second, some peripheral agents might produce some public good to
complement the amount received from their neighbors. However, periphery
players as a whole cannot produce but a limited amount of public good,
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otherwise players to whom they link would receive too large an amount of
public good. Furthermore, the amount of public good acquired via each
link cannot fall below a certain threshold determined by the linking cost.
Therefore, the number of agents that produce more than an infinitesimal
amount of public good and the number of agents that receive links are
bounded as the population size increases. Hence, in large societies, a small
group of players produce a significant amount of public good, while most
other players either only free ride or produce almost nothing.
2.4 Inequality
Networks can increase inequality, i.e. the difference in payoffs across agents
in isolation versus in a network. This happens in particular when the
best types access a large amount of public good from active free riders, as
happens for some agents in the examples of Figures 2 and 3.
In the examples reported in Table 1 however, the best types do not
benefit much from the network because free riders produce little or nothing.
In these cases, the best type actually has the lowest equilibrium payoff, so
that the network dampens inequality with respect to these agents.
f(x, g) as in Fig. 2 and k = .1 f(x, g) as in Fig. 2 and k = .6 fi(x, g) as in Fig. 3 and k = .65
i ci ai x
∗
i U
∗
i U
∗
i (a, ∅) ci ai x∗i U∗i U∗i (a, ∅) bi ai x∗i U∗i U∗i (a, ∅)
1 .747 1.792 1.103 1.853 1.339 .6 2.777 2.777 1.666 1.666 1.849 9.5 9.5 2.85 2.85
2 .774 1.669 .127 2.386 1.290 .8 1.562 0 2.777 1.25 1.754 8.55 0 2.565 4.757
3 .775 1.665 .123 2.385 1.205 .83 1.452 0 2.777 1.205 1.686 7.9 0 2.37 4.548
4 .831 1.448 .095 2.028 1.203 .831 1.448 0 2.777 1.203 1.627 7.35 0 4.364 2.205
5 .832 1.417 .091 2.028 1.202 .840 1.448 0 2.777 1.190 1.621 7.3 0 4.347 2.19
6 .833 1.414 .088 2.028 1.200 .841 1.448 0 2.777 1.189 1.370 5.21 0 3.571 1.563
7 .834 1.411 .084 2.028 1.200 .842 1.448 0 2.777 1.188 1.082 3.25 0 2.684 .975
8 .835 1.434 .081 2.028 1.198 .9 1.235 0 2.777 1.111 .657 1.2 0 1.376 .36
Table 1: The impact on inequality of star networks with 1 as the hub.
Overall, how networks affect inequality depends on how much free riders
produce and who benefits more from a link. In large societies, the law of
the few implies that there are few active agents that receive links. Hence, it
is not possible to free ride on most free riders, and the only element which
matters is how the gains from a connection vary with type.
Define Ui = fi(ai)− ciai for all i ∈ N . We say that in a given network
g, the inequality between any two players i and j such that i < j decreases
if Ui(x
∗, g∗)− Uj(x∗, g∗) ≤ Ui − Uj.
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Proposition 3 Given any g∗ and any i < j which receive no in-links, as
n → ∞, under heterogeneity in production cost, the inequality between i
and j decreases and, under heterogeneity in valuation, it increases.
In large populations, by the law of the few, the proportion of players that
receive in-links is very small, so that this result applies to most players.
Intuitively, the possibility of establishing links benefits those players that
gain more from a connection. Under cost heterogeneity, these are the worst
players, and thus, inequality decreases. Under heterogeneity in benefits, the
best types gain most from each link, and thus, inequality increases.
3 Discussion
Robustness Analysis. The benchmark model described in Section 2 is
very stylized. However, we now derive precise bounds on the robustness of
our characterization to having both cost and valuation heterogeneity at the
same time, indirect flow of public good, decay, imperfect substitutability,
and (some) heterogeneity in the linking cost. To do so, we introduce the
following payoffs
Ui(x, g, ε) = (1 + ε1,i)fi

x1−ε6i + (1− ε4) ∞∑
d=1
εd−15
∑
j∈Ndi (g¯)
x1−ε6j
 11−ε6

−(ci − ε2,i)xi − ηOUTi (g)(k + ε3,i) (4)
where Ndi (g¯) = {j ∈ N : di,j(g¯) = d} is defined as the set of neighbors that
are connected to player i via a shortest path of length d. The shocks are:
– ε1 ∈ RN and ε2 ∈ RN introduce both types of heterogeneity at the
same time; indeed, agents are often heterogeneous along several dimensions;
– ε3 ∈ RN introduces heterogeneity in linking costs; for example, some
individuals prefer to talk more or have cheaper phone rates;6
– ε4 ∈ [0, 1] introduces decay: some information is lost when transmitted
to neighbors, either because communication is imperfect or some knowledge
is tacit. Hence, if i is linked to j, the spillover she gets is only (1− ε4)xj;
6We do not study differences in the linking cost per se since they do not affect players’
type—the optimal public good production in isolation—which is the focus of our paper.
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– ε5 ∈ [0, 1] introduces indirect spillovers since often the public good
is also shared among indirect neighbors; in that case, information is dis-
counted by ε5 for each link it travels in the network.
7 For example, con-
sumers who get information from market mavens might share it with others;
– ε6 ∈ [0,∞) captures imperfect substitutability between individuals’
efforts, for example because the information collected displays some content
heterogeneity (as in Zhang and van der Schaar, 2012).
We denote an equilibrium of the game by (x∗(ε), g∗(ε)) and the optimal
amount of the public good an agent would collect in isolation by ai(ε) to
stress the dependence on the shocks ε. The following proposition describes
how to determine precise bounds on ε for g∗ to remain an equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Under heterogeneity in valuation or in production cost, for
each strict equilibrium network g∗, there exist shocks ε such that g∗ is an
equilibrium network of the perturbed game if |ε| < ε¯.
The key ingredients in obtaining this result are the following. First, each
agent’s payoffs are continuous in the shocks. Second, in strict equilibria, all
inequalities representing agents’ optimal linking decisions are strict. Hence,
there is room to perturb payoffs. It is then enough to check that the effort
level of agents can be adjusted in a consistent way, which in general is
possible given that agents are heterogeneous. Furthermore, we can find
shocks such that inactive agents remain inactive. In that case, the law of
the few holds also for the perturbed game.
Two-sided Link Formation and Transfers. Some situations that can
be captured by our model include bilateral R&D collaborations among firms
or local constituencies that provide services and share them with nearby ju-
risdictions. In these cases, however, mutual consent is needed to share the
public good. Furthermore, agents might ask for compensation to commu-
nicate the information they acquire. In what follows, we study the impact
of this different network formation protocol on equilibrium properties.8
7For ε5 = 0, our benchmark models arise. Since ε5 converges to zero from above,
it is natural to define limε5→0+ ε5
0 = 1. If instead ε5 = 1, equilibrium networks are
minimally connected with possibly some isolated agents.
8Without transfers, other equilibria arise because players refuse some links once they
have acquired the optimal amount of public good. Some examples are available upon
request.
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We denote the transfers proposed by player i by τi = {τij}j∈N , where
τij ∈ R for all j ∈ N. We assume that g¯ij = 1 if, and only if, τij + τji ≥ k.
A strategy profile s = (x, τ) specifies investments x and transfers τ =
{τ1, ..., τn}. The payoff function is then defined as
Ui(x, τ) = fi
(
xi +
∑
j∈Ni(g¯)
xj
)
− cixi −
∑
j∈N
g¯ijτij. (5)
In equilibrium, a link is formed if it is profitable and, if a link is not there,
at least one of the two agents involved does not benefit from it. Formally,
Bloch and Jackson (2007) and G&G define pairwise equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1 A strategy s∗ is a pairwise equilibrium if (1.) s∗ is a Nash
equilibrium, and (2.) for all τ ∗ij + τ
∗
ji < k, if Ui(x
′
i, x
′
j, τ
′
ij, τ
′
ji, x
∗
−ij) > Ui(s),
then Uj(x
′
i, x
′
j, τ
′
ij, τ
′
ji, x
∗
−ij) < Uj(s
∗), for all x′i, x
′
j ∈ X and for all τ ′ij, τ ′ji.
Proposition 5 shows that for each strict equilibrium in the benchmark mod-
els, there is an equilibrium under two-sided link formation, such that the
resulting network is identical.
Proposition 5 Under heterogeneity in valuation or in production cost,
take a strict equilibrium (x∗, τ ∗) in the model with one-sided linking. For
all i and j, let τij be such that if g
∗
ij = 1, then τ
∗
ij = k + ε, ε > 0, while
if g∗ij = 0, then τ
∗
ij = −ε. Then, (x∗, τ ∗) is a strict equilibrium in the
two-sided model with transfers that induces g¯∗.
The proof of this proposition is trivial and hence omitted. Intuitively, if
under one-sided linking an agent is willing to sponsor a link, the other agent
accepts this link if the proposing player bears most of its cost.
Homogeneous Agents (G&G). When agents are homogeneous, strict
equilibria are complete core-periphery structures in which the law of the
few holds. Moreover, there are at most two levels of production. Compared
with these results, we get richer structures and some striking differences.
First, all active agents cannot be connected and share all their neighbors
since each agent’s optimal amount of public good is different (Lemmata
2 and 3). Hence, either a core does not emerge (Theorem 1) or active
periphery agents do not all connect to the same core agents (Theorem 2).
Second, for strict equilibria, there is a discontinuity in the limit of the
heterogeneous to the homogeneous population case since some links need
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to be established or deleted to get complete core-periphery structures.9
There are two exceptions: (i) stars are equilibria in all the models men-
tioned; and (ii) some complete multipartite graphs, such as the one in
Figure 2(a), are both strict equilibria with heterogeneous production cost
and non-strict equilibria with homogeneous agents.10 Therefore, it might
be inappropriate to focus on strict equilibria when agents are homogeneous.
Finally, when agents are homogeneous, even infinitesimal complemen-
tarity in neighbors’ actions or decay in information flow might destroy the
equilibrium characterization. When agents are heterogeneous instead, equi-
librium networks are robust to decay, as well as to many other extensions.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a local public good game with an endogenous choice
of neighbors among heterogeneous agents. Depending on the dimensions
along which agents are heterogeneous (which in isolation is not relevant),
we find that (i) active agents form either complete multipartite or nested
split graphs, and (ii) the network reduces or increases inequality for most
agents. In both models, the law of the few holds in large societies.
The source of heterogeneity matters because it determines how the gains
from a connection differ across types. In equilibrium, this affects the rela-
tionship between outcomes or type and network statistics. In this sense,
our results are relevant beyond the theoretical literature of networks.
Surprisingly, the network structures we single out also arise under strate-
gic complements when players’ best replies are either convex (Hiller, 2012)
or concave (Baetz, 2015). Hence, future research should investigate whether
more general results are obtainable.
9For example, consider the network in Figure 3(a). This is no longer an equilibrium
if a¯1 → a¯2 because x∗2 → 0. Hence, as agents get more homogeneous, eventually only
the star with 1 as the hub is an equilibrium. Yet, at the limit, i.e., when all agents are
homogeneous, other complete core-periphery structures are equilibria.
10For example, consider the network in Figure 2(a). Let the economy converge to
the homogeneous agents’ case in the following way: first, a1 = a2 = a¯ and ai = a for
i = 3, ..., 8, i.e. there are two types. Then, Figure 2(a) is an equilibrium as a¯→ a→ .527
if a ∈ [(11k/12 + √(11k/12)2 + a¯/6, 11k√a¯/6 + a¯/6]. Eventually, it is a non-strict
equilibrium when a = a¯ = .527. The other equilibria are periphery sponsored stars with
1 or 2 as the hub; if a 6= a¯ both of them can be active under some conditions.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose fi = f for all i ∈ N . Then, GCi(xz, y) =
f(x′+xz +y)−f(xi+y)−ci(x′−xi) becomes ci(xi−x′) if xi−x′ > 0, i.e., i
is active when linking to z, or f(xz+y)−f(xi+y)+cixi otherwise. In both
cases, GCi is increasing in ci and, hence, in i. Suppose instead ci = c for all
i ∈ N . Then, GCi(xz, y) = fi(x′+ xz + y)− fi(xi + y)− c(x′− xi) becomes
c(xi − x′) if i is active when linking to z, or fi(xz + y) − fi(xi + y) + cxi
otherwise. Since ∂2fi/∂x∂i < 0, GCi is decreasing in i. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that s∗ = (x∗, g∗) is a Nash equilibrium and
that the active players are all connected among them. In other words, for
all active i, j ∈ N , g¯ij = 1. Take two players i, j ∈ N , then ai 6= aj. If they
are active, ai = xi +
∑
z∈N,z 6=i xz and aj = xj +
∑
z∈N,z 6=j xz. But i and j
have the same neighbors and g¯ij = 1, which implies ai = xi+
∑
z∈N,z 6=i xz =
xj +
∑
z∈N,z 6=j xz = aj. At the same time, ai 6= aj, a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 1. First we show that for any active i and j such that
i < j, x∗i > x
∗
j . Suppose ad absurdum this is not the case. Without loss of
generality, consider first the best type j and the worst type i < j such that
x∗i < x
∗
j . We show in a series of Lemmata that a contradiction emerges.
Lemma 4 Suppose there exist players i, j and z such that g∗iz = 1 but
g¯∗jz = 0 and x
∗
z > x
∗
j ≥ 0. Then, it holds that x∗z − x∗j > ai − aj.
Proof of Lemma 4. The result is trivial if ai < aj since x
∗
z > x
∗
j ≥ 0.
If ai > aj, define ∆ = x
∗
z − x∗j . In order to prove that (aj + ∆) > ai, we
suppose ad absurdum that (aj + ∆) ≤ ai. Then, the following inequalities
arise: since ci < cj, it holds that k−cix∗j > k−cjx∗j . Since j is not linked to
z, it holds that k− cjx∗j > f (aj + ∆)− f (aj) . Finally, since (aj + ∆) ≤ ai,
by the concavity of f , f(aj + ∆)− f(aj) ≥ f(ai)− f(ai−∆). Together this
yields k − cix∗j > f(ai)− f(ai −∆). Thus, player i is strictly better off to
break the link with z and to invest xj instead, a contradiction. 
Lemma 5 Suppose that there exist i and j such that i < j and x∗i < x
∗
j .
Then, (i) the set of players Z = {z : x∗z > 0, g∗iz = 1, g¯∗jz = 0} is non-
empty; (ii) for any z ∈ Z, x∗z > x∗j and x∗z − x∗j > ai − aj; (iii) the set
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of players P = {p : x∗p > 0, g∗pj = 1, g¯∗pi = 0} is non-empty; (iv) g¯∗ij = 0;
(v) for any p ∈ P , ai > ap; (vi) there exists a non-empty set of players
L = {l : x∗l > 0, g¯∗lj = 1, g∗li = 1, g¯∗lp = 0 for any p ∈ P}.
Proof of Lemma 5. If there are i and j such that i < j and x∗i <
x∗j , it must be the case that
∑
h∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
h >
∑
h∈Nj(g¯∗) x
∗
h (since ai > aj).
However, i does not receive more in-links than j (since x∗i < x
∗
j). Indeed,
if there is a player l such that g∗li = 1, then g¯
∗
lj = 1. (Obviously this holds
if g∗jl = 1. If g
∗
li = 1, but g¯
∗
lj = 0, then l would profitably sever the link
with i and link to j. This implies that g¯∗lj = 1 whenever g
∗
li = 1.) Hence,
given g∗, it holds that {l : g∗li = 1} ⊆ {l : g∗lj = 1}, and therefore that
{l : g∗jl = 1} ⊂ {l : g∗il = 1}. Thus, there exists a non-empty set of players
Z = {z : x∗z > 0, g∗iz = 1, g¯∗jz = 0}. This concludes the proof of part (i).
To show part (ii), pick any z ∈ Z. Then, g∗iz = 1 implies that cix∗z > k,
and since cj > ci, it holds that cjx
∗
z > k, that is, it is cheaper for j to link
to z rather than to produce x∗z by herself. However, j does not link to z
implying that by linking to z, j would stop producing and f(aj)− cjx∗j =
f(x∗j +
∑
h∈Nj(g¯∗) x
∗
h) − cjx∗j > f(x∗z +
∑
h∈Nj(g¯∗) x
∗
h) − k. Then by Lemma
4, x∗z > x
∗
j and x
∗
z − x∗j > ai − aj. This concludes the proof of part (ii).
To show part (iii), suppose instead that P = ∅. Pick any z′ ∈ Z. Then,
the inequality aj − x∗j + x∗z′ > ai, shown in part (ii), is violated since∑
l:g∗lj=g
∗
li=1
x∗l +
∑
t:g∗jt=g
∗
it=1
x∗t + x
∗
z′ ≤
∑
l:g∗lj=g
∗
li=1
x∗l +
∑
t:g∗jt=g
∗
it=1
x∗t +
∑
z:g∗iz=1,g¯
∗
jz=0
x∗z + x
∗
i .
Then, j needs to have more active in-links than i in order for aj−x∗j +x∗z′ >
ai to hold. Hence, P is non-empty. This concludes the proof of part (iii).
To prove part (iv), we need to show that g∗ij = 0 and g
∗
ji = 0. Suppose first
that g∗ij = 1. Pick any z ∈ Z. From part (ii) it follows that f(aj − x∗j +
x∗z)− k > f(ai)− k. Suppose that i links to j paying k. Then, f(ai)− k >
f(ai) − cix∗j . Since ai > aj and ci < cj, it holds that f(ai) − cix∗j >
f(aj)− cjx∗j . Finally, since j is not linked to z it holds that f(aj)− cjx∗j >
f(aj − x∗j + x∗z)− k, a contradiction. Thus, player i does not link to j.
Furthermore, g∗ji = 0 since x
∗
i < x
∗
j < x
∗
z and j does not link to z: if
g∗ji = 1, then j has a profitable deviation to sever the link with i and link
to z instead, a contradiction. This concludes the proof of part (iv).
To show part (v), pick any p ∈ P and suppose ad absurdum that ap > ai.
Then, x∗p > x
∗
i since we assumed that j is the best type and i < j the worst
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type such that x∗i < x
∗
j . Pick some z ∈ Z. Then, either x∗p > x∗z or x∗p < x∗z.
In both cases a contradiction arises. In the first case, since g∗iz = 1, also
p and i are linked which contradicts that g¯∗pi = 0, and in the second, the
same argument as in part (iv) applies (that is, Lemma 4 holds analogously
for p and j), and thus, g¯∗jp = 0, which contradicts that g
∗
pj = 1. This shows
that ai > ap and concludes the proof of part (v) of Lemma 5.
To show part (vi), suppose ad absurdum that L = ∅. Consider now p ∈ P .
Since g∗pj = 1 and x
∗
p > 0, p is also linked to any z ∈ Z and to all other
players to which i links. Thus, p receives x∗p + x
∗
j which i does not, while i
receives x∗i which p does not. Since x
∗
j > x
∗
i , x
∗
p+x
∗
j > x
∗
i . Hence, p receives
strictly more public good than i. This contradicts ai > ap, as shown in part
(v), and x∗p > 0 implies, by Lemma 2, that p accesses exactly ap. Hence,
there is a player l such that x∗l > 0, g
∗
li = 1 and g¯
∗
lp = 0. If g¯
∗
lp = 1, then, by
the same argument, a contradiction would arise. This implies that x∗i > 0
and g¯∗lj = 1 and concludes the proof of part (vi) of Lemma 5. 
Lemma 6 If there are i and j such that i < j and x∗i < x
∗
j , given the sets
of players P and L as defined above, then (i) x∗i > x
∗
p, for any p ∈ P ; (ii)
there exists a non-empty set of players Q = {q : x∗q > 0, g∗qp = 1, g¯∗ql = 0
for any p ∈ P and for any l ∈ L}; (iii) for any p ∈ P and for any l ∈ L,
x∗p > x
∗
l ; (iv) for any l ∈ L, g∗lj = 1 and g∗jl = 0; (v) there exists a non-
empty set of players R = {r : x∗r > 0, g∗rl = 1, g¯∗rp = 1 for any p ∈ P and
for any l ∈ L}.
Proof of Lemma 6. To show part (i): since g∗pj = 1 but g¯
∗
ij = 0, there
is no player h such that g∗ih = 1 but g
∗
ph = 0, if not i (p) would profitably
sever the link with h (j) and link to j (h) if x∗j > x
∗
h (x
∗
j < x
∗
h). Suppose
now ad absurdum that x∗p > x
∗
i . Then, for any e such that g
∗
ei = 1, g
∗
ep = 1.
Therefore, p has at least as many in- and out-links as i. Furthermore,
since x∗j > x
∗
i and g
∗
pj = 1, while g¯
∗
ij = 0, by Lemma 4 it holds that
ai−x∗i +x∗j > ap. However, rewriting and simplifying this inequality we get
a contradiction because x∗j <
∑
q:g∗hp=1∧g¯∗hi=0 x
∗
h+
∑
h:g∗ph=1∧g¯∗ih=0 x
∗
h+x
∗
p+x
∗
j .
Hence, x∗i > x
∗
p is necessary for i to attract more active in-links than p.
This concludes the proof of part (i) of Lemma 6.
To show part (ii), note that for any l ∈ L and p ∈ P , x∗i > x∗p and g∗li = 1
while g¯∗pi = 0. Hence, from Lemma 4, ap − x∗p + x∗i > al. Suppose now ad
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absurdum that players of type p and l receive the same amount of public
good via in-links. There is no player h such that g∗ph = 1 but g
∗
lh = 0, if not
l (p) would profitably sever the link with i (h) and link to h (i) if x∗h > x
∗
i
(x∗h < x
∗
i ). Hence, l receives more public good than p via out-links, at least
from i. Finally, l produces x∗l . Hence, ap − x∗p + x∗i < al, a contradiction.
This concludes the proof of part (ii) of Lemma 6.
Hence, x∗p > x
∗
l > 0 for all l ∈ L and p ∈ P if not any player q ∈ Q would
profitably deviate and link to l. This in turn implies that g∗lj = 1 and
g∗jl = 0, if not j would have a profitable deviation to sever the link with l
and establish one with i or some z ∈ Z (since by part (i), x∗i > x∗p, and as
just shown x∗p > x
∗
l ). This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.(iii) and (iv).
To show (v), suppose ad absurdum that R = ∅. Pick p′ ∈ P. Then, since
x∗p′ > x
∗
l , g
∗
qp′ = 1, and g¯
∗
lp′ = 0, (i) by Lemma 4, it holds that al−x∗l +x∗p′ >
aq, and, (ii) q has more active out-links than l (to p ∈ P ). Then,∑
h:g∗lh=g
∗
qh=1
x∗h + x
∗
l − x∗l + x∗p′ <
∑
m:g∗mq=1,g¯∗ml=0
x∗m +
∑
h:g∗lh=g
∗
qh=1
x∗h +
∑
p:g∗qp=1,g¯∗lp=0
x∗p + x
∗
q,
or x∗p′ <
∑
m:g∗mq=1∧g¯∗ml=0 x
∗
m +
∑
p:g∗qp=1∧g¯∗lp=0 x
∗
p + x
∗
q. This contradicts al −
x∗l + x
∗
p′ > aq.This concludes the proof of part (v) of Lemma 6. 
Lemma 7 There exist l ∈ L and p ∈ P such that g¯∗lp = 0.
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose that al > ap. Since x
∗
p > x
∗
l , the argument
of part (iv) of Lemma 5 applies, implying that g¯∗lp = 0. Suppose instead
that ap > al. Since x
∗
i > x
∗
l and g
∗
pi = 0, g
∗
pl = 0. Suppose ad absurdum
that g∗lp = 1 for all l ∈ L and for all p ∈ P .
Then, i and p have the same active in-links. Compare the amount of public
good that i and p receive, respectively: player i receives x∗i +
∑
h:g∗hi=1
x∗h +∑
m:g∗im=1
x∗m and player p receives x
∗
p + x
∗
j +
∑
h:g∗hp=1
x∗h +
∑
m 6=j:g∗pm=1 x
∗
m.
There is no player h such that g∗ih = 1 but g
∗
ph = 0, if not i (p) would
profitably sever the link with h (j) and link to j (h) if x∗j > x
∗
h (x
∗
j < x
∗
h).
However, since g∗pj = 1, g¯
∗
ij = 0 and x
∗
j > x
∗
i , Lemma 4 implies that
ai− x∗i + x∗j > ap. Using g∗lp = 1, this yields 0 < x∗p +
∑
m 6=j:g∗pm=1∧g¯∗im=0 x
∗
m,
where the sum are p’s out-links to players other than j to which i is not
linked. This is a contradictionand it concludes the proof of Lemma 7. 
The results of Lemma 6 for players p ∈ P and l ∈ L apply analogously to
players of type q ∈ Q and r ∈ R after relabeling p as q and l as r.
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A recursive argument arises since, when someone produces more than a
more efficient player, there are some active players that link to both of
them and some that only link to the player producing more. In turn, these
last players produce more and need to receive more active in-links. And so
on and so forth. However, the set of players is finite, and eventually there
are agents who have no further active in-links. A contradiction then arises,
showing that in a strict equilibrium better active types produce more.
Suppose now that active agents do not form a complete multipartite graph.
Then, there exist i and j such that g¯∗ij = 0 and, there is z such that g
∗
zi = 1,
g¯∗jz = 0 and x
∗
z > 0. Clearly, x
∗
i > x
∗
j , if not z would rather link to j. This
implies that i < j. For agents z and j, there is no player h such that
g∗jh = 1 but g¯
∗
zh = 0, if not z (j) would profitably sever the link with i (h)
and link to h (i), if x∗h > x
∗
i (x
∗
h < x
∗
i ); i.e., z has no less out-links than j.
Since x∗i > x
∗
j and g
∗
zi = 1 but g¯
∗
zj = 0, by Lemma 4, aj − x∗j + x∗i > az, or∑
l:g∗lj=1
x∗l +
∑
h:g∗jh=1
x∗h + x
∗
i >
∑
l:g∗lz=1
x∗l +
∑
h6=i:g∗zh=1 x
∗
h + x
∗
i + x
∗
z. This
holds only if
∑
h:g∗lj=1
x∗l >
∑
h:g∗lz=1
x∗l . Hence, there exists l
(0) such that
x∗
l(0)
> 0, g∗
l(0)j
= 1 and g¯∗
l(0)z
= 0, thus implying x∗j > x
∗
z and j < z.
Now consider l(0) and z. There is no h such that g∗zh = 1 but g¯
∗
l(0)h
= 0, if not
z (l(0)) would sever the link with h (j) and link to j (h) if x∗j > x
∗
h (x
∗
j < x
∗
h).
Since x∗j > x
∗
z and g
∗
l(0)j
= 1 but g¯∗
l(0)z
= 0, by Lemma 4, az−x∗z +x∗j > al(0) ,
or
∑
l:g∗lz=1
x∗l +
∑
h:g∗zh=1
x∗h+x
∗
j >
∑
l:g∗
ll(0)
=1 x
∗
l +
∑
h6=j:g∗
l(0)h
=1 x
∗
h+x
∗
j +x
∗
l(0)
.
This holds only if
∑
l:g∗lz=1
x∗l >
∑
l:g∗
ll(0)
=1 x
∗
l . Hence, there exists l
(1) such
that g∗
l(1)z
= 1 and g¯∗
l(1)l(0)
= 0. This implies x∗z > x
∗
l(0)
and z < l(0).
Now consider l(0) and l(1). The same argument holds, and can be iterated
for any couple of players l(i) and l(i+1), until we get at most to l(n), who
have no more in-links than l(n−1) because there are no players left that can
link only to l(n) but not to l(n−1). At that point, we reach a contradiction.
Hence, active agents form a complete multipartite graph.
Finally, consider i and j belonging to the same independent set, i.e., g¯∗ji = 0,
and a player l > {i, j} such that x∗s > 0 for s = i, j, l. Then g∗li = 1. Suppose
that ηl(g¯) > ηi(g¯) = ηj(g¯). Without loss of generality, consider i < j. Then,
g∗lj = 1, and by Lemma 4, aj − x∗j + x∗i > al. This is possible if and only if
j receives more in-links than l, implying x∗j > x
∗
l . If x
∗
j > x
∗
l , then j < l.
Then, the same holds for all players to which l links but i does not. If there
are more players of type j than of type l, clearly l receives more public good
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than j, which by Lemma 2, leads to a contradiction with x∗l , x
∗
j > 0 and
j < l. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1. 
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we show parts (i) and (ii). Note that if there
are players j and i such that g∗ji = 1, then there is no player z such that
x∗z > x
∗
i and g¯
∗
zi = 0. Suppose not. Then, since g
∗
ji = 1, k < cx
∗
i , player z
could profitably reduce effort by x∗i linking to i instead, a contradiction.
Therefore, any i receiving active in-links is connected to all players that
produce more than x∗i . This set of agents forms the core, C(g¯∗). Since at
least player 1 is in the core, C(g¯∗) 6= ∅, i.e. n˜1 ≥ 1. By Lemma 3, n˜1 < n.
Next we show that if there is more than one player in C(g¯∗), then there is a
player in P(g¯∗) exerting a positive amount of effort. Suppose not. Then, all
players in C(g¯∗) receive an identical amount of public good, a contradiction.
Moreover, for any i < j in the core, x∗i > x
∗
j and ηi(g¯
∗) > ηj(g¯∗). Suppose
not and that x∗i ≤ x∗j . Then, i gets no more in-links than j from the
periphery and x∗i +
∑
z∈Ni(g¯∗) xz ≤ xj+
∑
z∈Nj(g¯∗) xz, a contradiction. Hence,
x∗i > x
∗
j and this implies that ηi(g¯
∗) > ηj(g¯∗).
Suppose that there is j, 1 < j < n˜1, who receives no in-links, i.e., j /∈ C(g¯∗).
Since aj > an˜1 and player n˜1 receives more public good than j via links,
x∗j > x
∗
n˜1
. Then, the periphery player who links to n˜1 can profitably deviate
by linking to j instead, a contradiction. Hence, all players 1, ..., n˜1 belong
to C(g¯∗). This concludes the proof of part (i).
Given that ηi(g¯
∗) > ηj(g¯∗) for any i < j in the core, it follows immediately
that, for any l,m ∈ P(g¯∗) such that l < m, ηOUTl (g∗) ≥ ηOUTm (g∗).
Note next that n˜1 < n˜2 ≤ n. Suppose that not all players n˜1 + 1, ..., n˜2
belong to P(g¯∗). Then, there is j, n˜1 < j < n˜2, who is in C(g¯∗) or isolated.
If j ∈ C(g¯∗), then j is active and gets more public good than n˜1 + 1, a
contradiction. If instead j is isolated, aj < x
∗
n˜1
. If not, since player n˜1
receives an in-link, it would be profitable for j to link to n˜1 and to produce
aj − x∗n˜1 . Hence, suppose that aj < x∗n˜1 . Then, j does not link to player
1, if k > fj(x
∗
1)− fj(aj) + caj. By the envelope theorem, the derivative of
this inequality’s right-hand side with respect to type is ∂fj(x∗1)/∂j− ∂fj(aj)/∂j,
which is negative since we assume that ∂2f/∂i∂x < 0 for all x > 0. Hence, if
it is not profitable for j to link to 1, it is neither profitable for all players
i > j, a contradiction. This concludes the proof of part (ii).
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The existence of a core in which players receive more in-links the better
their type implies that the component of the network is a nested split graph.
To show part (iii), consider player n. If n˜2 = n, then n ∈ P(g¯∗), x∗n ≥ 0
and g∗n1 = 1. Hence, I(g¯∗) = ∅. If n˜2 < n, then n sponsors no link and
fn(an) − can yields n a larger payoff than any other strategy (xn, gn). In
this case, n is isolated and I(g¯∗) 6= ∅, if n receives no in-link. Suppose
that n receives some in-link. Then, n belongs to the core and receives more
public good than n˜1 + 1, the player in P(g¯∗) who wants more public good,
a contradiction. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2. 
Proof of Proposition 1. In any component only one agent produces to
minimize linking costs. Under heterogeneity in production cost, it is effi-
cient that only the most efficient agent, 1, produces while all others link to
1. Hence, a star with 1 as a hub is the efficient network. Under heterogene-
ity in valuation, suppose there are several components. Since agents are
heterogeneous, different components produce different amounts of public
good. Thus, players in less productive components would profitably link
to the highest producing player. Hence, the efficient solution is a star with
only one active agent.
To show part (a), note that g¯12 is the first to be severed as k increases since
f(aj)− cjaj is smaller for higher j but linking to 1 yields any player f(a1).
Hence, defining y such that (n−1)f ′(y) = c1, the social planner maximizes
max
x,m
mf(x)− c1x− (m− 1)k +
n−m+1∑
j=2
[f(aj)− cjaj] . (A-1)
Given m, the objective function of the planner problem (A-1) is linearly
decreasing in k with a slope equal to −(m − 1) and an intercept at k = 0
that is lower as more agents are isolated; (A-1) is constant in k when all
agents are isolated. The objective function (A-1) is the upper envelope of
all these linear functions, i.e., it is piece-wise decreasing in k. Therefore, the
optimal m decreases as k increases, and for any k, there exists a threshold
n > 1 such that all players i ≥ n connect to 1 and the others are isolated.
The star’s hub produces yC(n) such that (n− n+ 2)f ′(yC(n)) = c1.
To show part (b), note that any player in the component can be the hub,
denoted by h, since ci = c for all i ∈ N . When gjh is severed, the linking
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cost k is saved, while the remaining social welfare changes by
fj(aj)− caj +
∑
i∈N\{j}
fi(y)− cy −
[∑
i∈N
fi(x)− cx
]
, (A-2)
where x solves
∑
i∈N f
′
i(x) = c and y solves
∑
i∈N\{j} f
′
i(y) = c. By the
envelope theorem, the derivative of (A-2) with respect to j is ∂fj(aj)/∂j−
∂fj(x)/∂j, which is positive since x > aj, ∂f/∂j < 0 and ∂
2f/(∂j∂x) < 0.
Hence, worst types are isolated. The number of isolated agents is given by
max
x,m
m∑
i=1
fi(x)− cx− (m− 1)k +
n∑
i=m+1
[fi(ai)− cai] . (A-3)
Given m, the objective function of the planner problem (A-3) is linearly
decreasing in k with a slope equal to −(m− 1) and an intercept at k = 0,
which is lower as more agents are isolated; the function is constant in k
when all agents are isolated. Since the objective function (A-3) is the
upper envelope of all these linear functions, it is piece-wise decreasing in k.
Therefore, the number of agents in the star decreases as k increases, and
for any k, there exists a threshold n¯ ≤ n such that all players i ≤ n¯ are in
the star and the others are isolated. The star’s hub produces yV (n¯) such
that
∑n¯
i=1 f
′
i(y
V (n¯)) = c. This concludes Proposition 1’s proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. If g∗ is empty, the statement follows trivially. If
the network is non-empty, for all players j such that ηOUTj (g
∗) > 0, g∗j1 = 1
holds. In both models, by Lemma 2, player 1 produces at most x∗1 =
a1−
∑
j:g¯∗1j=1
x∗j . For players j with x
∗
j > 0 to link to 1, x
∗
1cj ≥ k must hold
(with cj = c when fj 6= f). Hence, (a1 −
∑
j:g¯∗1j=1
x∗j)cj ≥ k. Suppose now
that limn→∞ |{j : x∗j > 0 and g∗j1 = 1}|/n > 0. If limn→∞
∑
j:g¯∗1j=1
x∗j =∞,
then since a1 <∞, by Lemma 2, player 1 is not active, a contradiction.
Re-label agents such that n < n′ if and only if xn > xn′ . Given 0 < x¯ <
∞, limn→∞
∑
j:g¯∗1j=1
x∗j = x¯ holds only if the series {xn}n decreases in n.
Even more, it must decrease faster than the series {1/n}n which does not
converge to a finite value. This implies that for any n, the smallest element
in the series is smaller than 1/(n− 1). For any ε > 0, take n¯(ε) such that
ε ≤ 1/(n¯ − 1). Hence, there are at most n¯(ε) players who link to 1 and
produce more than ε, so that, for any ε > 0, limn→∞A(x∗, g∗, ε)/n = 0.
The same arguments apply to all players receiving in-links. Suppose now
that limn→∞AIN(x∗, g∗)/n > 0. If players in this set link to 1, the same
arguments as above apply. If instead they do not link to 1, there are z ∈ N
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such that czx
∗
j > k > c1x
∗
j and g
∗
zj = 1 for all such j who are in the indepen-
dent set of 1. This is possible only under cost heterogeneity. Clearly, xz = 0
since limn→∞AIN(x∗, g∗)/n > 0 implies limAIN (x∗,g∗)→∞
∑
j:g∗zj=1
x∗j = ∞,
and f(
∑
j:g∗zj=1
x∗j) − f(
∑
j:g∗zj=1
x∗j − minj:g∗zj=1 x∗j) > k. Yet, f ′′ < 0 im-
plies lim∑
j:g∗
zj
=1 x
∗
j→∞
[
f(
∑
j:g∗zj=1
x∗j)− f(
∑
j:g∗zj=1
x∗j −minj:g∗zj=1 x∗j)
]
= 0,
a contradiction. Then, limn→∞AIN(x∗, g∗)/n = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let n → ∞ and consider i < j which both
receive no in-links. Then |Ui(x∗, g∗)−Uj(x∗, g∗)| ≤ Ui−Uj. Note first that
Ui > Uj because, since there is no z ∈ N such that g∗zi = 1 or g∗zj = 1, i can
replicate j’s strategy and get higher payoffs. Consider now the two models.
Under heterogeneity in the production cost, i and j can be active or
inactive. If they are both active, then inequality between i and j de-
creases if ci(ai − xi)− kηOUTi (g∗) ≤ cj(aj − xj)− kηOUTj (g∗), which means
ci
∑
z:g¯∗zi=1
xz ≤ cj
∑
z:g¯∗zj=1
xz. If i and j have the same neighbors, then the
statement follows. If j has more out-links, by Theorem 1, j is in a lower
independent set. But then there is z such that g∗zi = 1, a contradiction.
If i and j are inactive, they have the same neighbors. Hence, Ui(x
∗, g∗) −
Uj(x
∗, g∗) = 0 while Ui −Uj > 0. Finally, if i is active while j is not, there
are two cases. (1) If ηi(g
∗) = ηj(g∗), Ui(x∗, g∗)− Uj(x∗, g∗) ≤ Ui − Uj can
be rewritten as f(ai − x∗i )− ci(ai − x∗i ) ≥ f(aj)− cjaj. This clearly holds
when ai − x∗i = aj. If not, the left-hand-side is increasing in ai − x∗i since
ai−x∗i < ai given our assumptions on f . Hence, the statement follows. (2)
If ηOUTj (g
∗) > ηOUTi (g
∗), Ui(x∗, g∗)− Uj(x∗, g∗) ≤ Ui − Uj can be rewritten
as f(
∑
z:gjz=1
xz)−k[ηOUTj (g∗)−ηOUTi (g∗)] ≥ f(aj)−cjaj. Since j has some
more link, say to z, f(
∑
z:gjz=1
xz)− kηOUTj (g∗) > f(ai − xi)− kηOUTi (g∗),
so that f(
∑
z:gji=1
xz)− k[ηOUTj (g∗)− ηOUTi (g∗)] ≥ f(ai − x∗i )− ci(ai − x∗i ).
This concludes the proof of the first part of Proposition 3.
Under heterogeneity in benefits, i and j can be active or inactive. Suppose
i and j are active and ηOUTi (g
∗) = ηOUTj (g
∗). Then, Ui(x∗, g∗)−Uj(x∗, g∗) ≥
Ui − Uj holds because ai − x∗i = aj − x∗j . Suppose i and j are active and
that i has an out-link more than j, to some player z. Then, Ui(x
∗, g∗) −
Uj(x
∗, g∗) ≥ Ui−Uj implies c(ai−xi)−kηOUTi (g∗) ≥ c(aj−xj)−kηOUTj (g∗).
Since all neighbors but z are common, this implies cxz ≥ k, which needs
to hold because i links to z. The same argument holds when i has more
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than one neighbor more than j. Hence, Ui(x
∗, g∗) − Uj(x∗, g∗) ≥ Ui − Uj.
When i and j are both inactive, suppose that ηOUTi (g
∗) = ηOUTj (g
∗). Then,
|Ui(x∗, g∗) − Uj(x∗, g∗)| ≥ |Ui − Uj| implies fi(
∑
z:g∗iz=1
xz) − ηOUTi (g∗)k −
fi(ai)+cai ≥ fj(
∑
z:g∗jz=1
xz)−ηOUTj (g∗)k−fj(aj)+caj. Then the condition
follows if fi(y) − fi(ai) + cai is decreasing in i for y > ai, i.e., higher
for better types. By the envelope theorem, this depends on ∂fi(y)/∂i −
∂fi(ai)/∂i, which is negative since ∂fi/∂i < 0 and ∂
2fi/(∂x∂i) < 0. Hence
inequality increases. The same argument holds when i has more links than
j since then, by optimality, fi(
∑
z:g∗iz=1
xz)−ηOUTi (g∗)k > fi(
∑
z:g∗jz=1
xz)−
ηOUTj (g
∗)k. This concludes the proof of Proposition 3. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a strict equilibrium (x∗, g∗) under
cost heterogeneity. Consider ε1 = (ε1,1, ..., ε1,n) ∈ RN , while εs = 0 for all
s = 2, .., 6. Clearly, (x∗, g∗) = (x∗(ε1 = 0), g∗(ε1 = 0)). For any agent i
such that x∗i = 0, ai <
∑
j∈N g¯
∗
ijx
∗
j by Lemma 2 while for any active agent i,
ai = x
∗
i +
∑
j∈N g¯
∗
ijx
∗
j . Defining the adjacency matrix of links among active
agents as g¯A, the vectors of their efforts and optimal efforts as x
∗
A(ε1) and
aA(ε1), respectively, and the A-dimensional identity matrix as IA,
aA(ε1) = x
∗
A(ε1)(IA + g¯
∗
A). (A-4)
This system has an interior solution for ε1 = 0. By Cramer’s rule, each
x∗i (ε1) is given by the ratio between the determinants of (IA + g¯
∗
A) with
column i replaced by vector aA(ε1) divided by the determinant of (IA+ g¯
∗
A).
Since, by Leibniz formula, this determinant is continuous in ai(ε1), for small
ε1 the solution x
∗
A(ε1) exists and is arbitrarily close to x
∗
A(ε1 = 0) as ε1 → 0.
Focusing on inactive agents, this implies that there is ε1 ∈ RN such that
ai <
∑
j∈N
g¯∗ijx
∗
j(ε1). (A-5)
Then, for all i ∈ N , Ui(x∗i (ε1), g∗i ) is continuous in ε1 and Ui(x∗, g∗) =
Ui(x
∗(ε1 = 0), g∗(ε1 = 0)). Finally, in strict equilibria, for any i ∈ N ,
there exists ε¯1 ∈ RN+ such that (A-5) and (A-4) are satisfied for all |ε1| <
ε¯1 and Ui(x
∗(ε1), g∗) > Ui(x′i, g
′
i, x
∗
−i(ε1), g
∗
−i) for any any (x
′
i, g
′
i) ∈ Si \
{(x∗i (ε1), g∗i }. Hence, the same network structure is an equilibrium.
Analogousy, it follows immediately that for all εs, s = 2, ..., 6, there is
ε¯s ∈ RN+ such that for any |εs| < ε¯s, g∗ is an equilibrium. 
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